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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction overthis appeal under Section 78-2-
2(3)0), U.C.A. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue presented is whether the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the Defendant dismissing breach of contract and waste claims by 
holding the cause of action had not accrued because the element of damages had 
not been shown. 
The standard of review is one of correctness without deference to the legal 
conclusions of the district court. Smith v. Hales & Warner Construction, Inc., 2005 
Ut.App. 38,107P.3d701. 
This issue was preserved for appeal in that the Defendant moved for summary 
judgment on this issue and Plaintiffs filed an opposing memorandum. (R. 377,404). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
No determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations have been identified. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action by joint owners of real property against a lessee for bringing 
toxic substances onto the leased property. The causes of action asserted as of the 
time of the summary judgment which is under appeal were for waste and breach of 
contract. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
This action was filed on October 12, 2001. The original complaint alleged 
causes of action for breach of contract, waste, conversion, unjust enrichment, and 
trespass. (R. 2). The original counsel withdrew a year later on October 15, 2002. 
(R. 106). New counsel appeared on January 28, 2003 (R. 117). 
A Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant was considered by the court 
and on July 22,2003 the court dismissed certain causes of action and left those for 
trespass, breach of contract, and waste in place. (R. 237). 
Another Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the Defendant on 
November 8,2004. (R. 250). Plaintiffs conceded that the trespass claim should be 
dismissed. (R. 404). The court considered the remaining claims for breach of 
contract and waste under the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and granted 
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the same without prejudice thereby eliminating all of the pending causes of action 
of the Plaintiffs as of March 8, 2005. (R. 524). See Addendum "A". 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2005. (R. 526). This appeal 
was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals on April 
6,2005. (R.532). 
C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT. 
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendant thereby dismissing all causes of action of the Plaintiffs on March 8,2005. 
(R. 524). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The Morley T. Atkin Trust leased the gravel pit in Tooele County in January 
1992 to McFarland & Hullinger, LLC for a period of 9 72 years. (R. 349). Cathy Atkin 
and Patsy Atkin are daughters of Morley T. Atkin, then deceased. (R. 349). Cathy, 
in turn, conveyed part of her interest to Tom Eleopulos. (R. 488). 
The lease relationship went through some changes which are not relevant to 
this appeal but McFarland & Hullinger retained an interest after the expiration of the 
original lease for access to the property. (R. 298). 
Patsy Atkin brought a partition action against her sister, Cathy Atkin, in March 
of 2000 seeking to divide the property that had been leased. (R. 349). That partition 
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action has not yet been formally concluded as it left open the final drawing of 
boundaries but conceptually it will result in Patsy Atkin owning the gravel pit at issue 
and leave Cathy Atkin and Tom Eleopulos with the north end of the property which 
does not include the gravel pit. (R. 266). 
Tom Eleopulos and Cathy Atkin observed during the period of time that the 
gravel pit was being regularly operated by the Defendant that rather than just gravel 
going out of the facility there was truckloads of material being brought into the facility 
and dumped. (R. 434). Plaintiffs began an investigation which included complaining 
to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Environmental 
Quality that dark colored soils were being dumped on the property and they 
suspected it would be toxic in nature. Counsel for Plaintiffs built on studies done by 
the state and federal agencies by hiring an expert to evaluate the situation. That 
expert determined there were some 600 truckloads of toxic materials brought into 
the gravel pit with a cleanup cost of not less than $1.5 million. (R. 429, 470). 
Plaintiffs claim to have incurred about $45,000.00 of expert and site study fees. (R. 
484). 
As the complaint shows (R. 2), Plaintiffs brought this action in an attempt to 
recover damage to their interest in the property, investigation costs and cleanup 
costs. 
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Mention should be made of a very important fact that is not in the record. 
Defendant has submitted to date no evidence or argument whatsoever in the record 
that there are not toxic substances not native to the location present on the property 
owned by the Plaintiffs. This is an uncontroverted fact in the current state of the 
record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants show in this brief that all of the elements of the causes of action for 
breach of contract and waste were present, including damages. The district court 
erred by not recognizing the Plaintiffs had raised sufficient facts to hold a trial as to 
whether damages had been incurred. The district court gave great weight to the 
partition action in the same court in not finding damages but the applicable law is 
that damages accrued at the time of the breach of contract and waste which all 
occurred during the time Plaintiffs owned the property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The facts and issues presented by this appeal are surprising straight forward. 
The facts are that the Plaintiffs owned a gravel pit jointly with Patsy Atkin and leased 
to the Defendant. A substantial quantity of toxic substances came onto the property 
during the leasehold of the Defendant. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover 
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damages for the injury to the land they owned but the property was partitioned to 
give Patsy Atkin the gravel pit before this lawsuit was resolved. The trial court held 
that because of the partition Plaintiffs suffered no damages and a cause of action 
had not accrued. 
The issue for decision is whether having a land partitioned to another before 
a cleanup effort was commenced by the Plaintiffs means they had no damages to 
pursue. This brief shows that the elements of a claim were all in place prior to the 
partition order which, in fact, is not yet finally concluded. See Addendum "B" for the 
order. 
II. APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review. 
In what has essentially become a legal mantra because the rule is so well 
established, this court in reviewing a summary judgment, accords no deference to 
the trial court and reviews the ruling for correctness. Moab Citizens Alliance v. 
Grand County, 2005 Ut. App. 323, 530 Utah. Adv. Rep. 20. Rule 56, governing 
summary judgments, by its very terms provides that summary judgment is not 
appropriate where there is a genuine issue of material fact. Put in the context of this 
case, summary judgment should not have been awarded if Plaintiffs can show 
sufficient facts to support that they did incur damages. 
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B. Accrual. 
Perhaps no legal principle is more fundamental than one may bring a cause 
of action only upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
elements of the cause of action. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
Questions of accrual of the cause of action often come up in the context of 
consideration of statutes of limitations. For example, in Colosmio v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 Ut. App. 436, 104 P.3d 646, this court gave an 
extensive analysis of when a cause of action accrues for consideration of application 
of a statute of limitations. The court explained that there must be a wrong done to 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff must know or reasonably should know of that wrong. 
In a contract action, this court has recognized that a cause of action accrues 
when a contract has been breached. Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 2005 Ut. App. 
225,114 P.3d 602. In reaching that conclusion, the Utah Court of Appeals followed 
S&G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) and Butcher 
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987). Both of those cases held that a contract 
action accrues at the time of breach. Clarke at footnote 1, mentions that Clarke had 
not suffered damages at the time his contract was breached but the court said the 
cause of action had still accrued under existing case law. 
7 
This court has earlier made clear what constitutes the elements of a breach 
of contract action. The court stated in Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBry, 2001 
Ut. App. 397, 38 P.3d 984, that the elements of a prima facie case for breach of 
contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach 
of the contract by the other party and, (4) damages. The damages available for a 
breach of contract include general contract damages and consequential damages 
so as to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he would have 
been in if the contract had been performed. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 Ut. 
App. 201,71 P.3d188. 
C. Damages. 
As explained above, damages are one of the basic elements of a cause of 
action for breach of contract. In Black v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2004 Ut. 66, 
100 P.3d 1163, the Utah Supreme Court considered the breach of a settlement 
agreement and the damages available for breach of contract. The court there 
recognized the general rule that breach of contract gives rise to general damages 
or those flowing naturally from the breach and consequential damages. 
Consequential damages are those reasonably within the contemplation or 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was made. 
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The question of damages is generally one of fact for the jury. Aspenwoods, 
LLC v. CAT., LLC, 2003 Ut. App. 28, 73 P.3d 947. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 Ut. 
104,990 P.2d 933, explained again the old rule that damages in a breach of contract 
claim are to serve the important purpose of compensating an injured party for actual 
injuries sustained so as that party may be restored, as near as possible to the 
position he or she was in prior to the injury. 
The fact that damages may be nominal is immaterial to the cause of action 
accruing. Nominal damages are, in fact, available for breach of contract and the 
statute of limitations begins to run on a contract breach even if the damages are not 
ascertained. Clarke v. Living Scriptures, 2005 Ut. App. 225,114 P.3d 602. 
III. THE CAUSES OF ACTION HAVE ACCRUED 
A. Introduction. 
The established facts in the record are that there was a contract - a lease -
between the plaintiffs and the defendant. That original contract provides that the 
tenant may use the property for the removal and sale of the gravel, sand, soil, and 
other aggregates on the premises. See Addendum "C", R. 323. There is no 
provision authorizing the tenant/defendant to bring toxic substances onto the 
property. Additionally, paragraph 2.3 of the lease provides that the lessee shall 
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obtain all necessary permits and comply with all applicable statues, regulations and 
orders or governmental bodies. (R. 311). 
Other important facts include that toxic substances are verified to be on the 
premises of the property and there is evidence produced that defendant brought 
them onto the property during the leasehold interest. (R. 470 and 136,140). 
B. Breach of Contract. 
Applying the elements of breach of contract outlined above, what the Plaintiffs 
have to show in this action is that there was a contract with the Defendant whose 
terms were breached with resulting damage. An examination of the facts in the 
record shows that all of the elements have been met. 
There is no reasonable dispute that the lease was in place between Cathy 
Atkin and Patsy Atkin as lessors and McFarland & Hullinger, LLC as lessee. Patsy 
Atkin has not been active in pursing the breach of contract. Cathy Atkin, as a 
lessor, has been very active. 
With respect to the second element, whether there was a breach of the 
contract, the existence of a breach is a question of fact for trial. Coalville City v. 
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah App. 1997). The record here clearly raises 
questions of fact as to the breach which sh reserved for trial. First, a large 
amount of toxic substances have been established by the Plaintiffs to be present in 
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the gravel pit during their ownership. Second, the appearance of the toxic 
substances in the gravel pit raise an issue of whether laws were violated by the 
lessee contrary to paragraph 2.3 of the lease. 
Potential violations of law, which are questions of fact for trial, include 42 
U.S.C. Section 6972 and 6973 and implementing regulations found in which prohibit 
the operation of a hazardous waste treatment facility, including transportation 
thereto, without an appropriate permit. See Addendum "D". The Utah Code 
prohibits in Sections 19-6-113,19-16-821, and 19-6-112 unpermitted transportation 
and storage of toxic and solid waste. See Addendum "E". The state has 
implementing regulations in the Utah Administrative Code including R315-8-2 
concerning failure to comply with preparedness and prevention requirements of 
R315-8.3 concerning waste handling, failure to provide contingency and emergency 
planning under R315-8-4, failure to protect ground water under R315-8-6, failure to 
provide notices, do general waste analysis and provide training required by R315-8-2 
and violation of closure and post-closure requirements of waste facilities under 
R315-8-7. Also potentially at issue for violations of solid waste permitting and 
management expressed in Utah Administrative Code R315-8-1 thru 320 and the 
illegal disposal of undocumented waste prohibited by R315-301-3 including the 
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operation of a solid waste facility without a permit in compliance with R315-301-5. 
See Addendum "E". 
Because Ms. Atkin and Mr. Eleopulos were owners, they have become 
exposed to personal liability for cleanup costs under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1 )(B) in Addendum "D". This liability for cleanup costs that may be ordered 
by the federal government is not abstract. That is, when the toxic substances were 
brought onto the property during the period of ownership of Ms. Atkin and Mr. 
Eleopulos both became immediately liable personally as owners of the property 
during the time of pollution. Also, the land itself was stigmatized by the placement 
of a very large quantity of toxic substances. 
The ruling of the court to the effect that damages had not accrued is 
analogous to arguing that because one has a dented automobile from an automobile 
accident there are no damages because the cost of repair had not been incurred. 
In fact, the damages were incurred as of the moment of impact. The Utah courts 
appear not to have yet spoken to the issue, but the Supreme Court of Kansas in 
Empire Manufacturing Company v. Empire Candle, Inc., 41 P.3d 798 (Kan. 2002), 
recognized what it identified as a "general rule" that damages in an action for breach 
of contract are to be measured as of the date of the breach. Keep in mind that the 
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Utah case law, explained above, holds that the statute of limitations can begin to run 
even before the amount of damages is ascertained for breach of contract. 
When toxic substances were put on the land Ms. Atkin and Mr. Eleopulos 
became potentially personally liable under federal environmental statutes for the 
cleanup cost estimated to be at least $1.5 million. Also, the property had been 
stigmatized, dented, if you will, at the moment the first truckload of pollution was 
dumped on the property. 
Utah allows in breach of contract claims recovery of general damages and 
consequential damages which were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract 
was entered. Thurston v. Workers'Compensation Fund of Utah, 2003 Ut. App. 483, 
83 P.3d 391. Consequently, there should have been a trial allowed here if Plaintiffs 
can show they suffered some injury. Consequential damages here would be the 
great cost of the scientific study done to determine what had been done to the gravel 
pit and the resulting exposure for cleanup costs and even criminal prosecution 
which were fixed by federal and state law as of the time the polluting material was 
brought onto the land. 
Finally, the amount and extent of damages are a question of fact for trial 
beyond dispute. Judd v. Drezqa, 2004 Ut. 91,103 P.3d 135. The trial court should 
not have granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim where there 
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was sufficient factual evidence raised to allow Plaintiffs to show they had incurred 
damages. In fact, the record suggests there are substantial damages incurred by 
the Plaintiffs. 
That the exposure of one to liability to a third party because of the acts of first 
party can be the subject of damages is supported by Utah's recognition of the third-
party tort rule. Under this rule, when the natural consequence of one's negligence 
leads to a dispute with a third party, the party that has been brought into the dispute 
may seek recovery from the party that caused them to be involved. Tolman v. 
Windchester Hills Water Company, Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1996). It is not 
a conceptual stretch from that established tort principle to finding an accrual of a 
federal claim against the Plaintiffs here to be real injury for which compensation 
should be made. 
In summary, the record is clear that all of the elements of breach of contract 
were present as of the time the complaint in this action was filed. First, there was 
a contract in place in the form of a lease. Second, the tenant had breached the 
lease by bringing toxic substances on the property contrary to the agreement to use 
the property only for the removal of gravel and related materials. Also, the provision 
of the lease requiring conformance of state and federal law had apparently been 
breached with a gross violation of environmental law. Finally, damages were 
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incurred in that the property was stigmatized while under the ownership of Atkin, tens 
of thousands of dollars was spent analyzing the problem by Atkin and Eleopulos and 
they had become personally liable for at least $1.5 million in cleanup costs. 
The district court clearly erred in concluding that the cause of action for breach 
of contract had not accrued because of lack of damages. The subsequent partition 
is irrelevant as damages accrue at the time of breach. 
C. The Waste Action Accrued. 
The elements of a cause of action for waste were clearly established in 
Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, Inc., 888 P.2d 659 (Utah 
App. 1994). This court explained there are three essential elements to establish a 
claim for waste caused by a lessee. The first element is that there must be an act 
constituting waste. This is an act of destruction, misuse, alteration or neglect of the 
premises. The act must be done by one legally in possession. Third, the act must 
prejudice the estate or interest in the estate of another. All of those elements are 
present here. 
As with the breach of contract analysis given above an examination of each 
of the elements of a cause of action for waste shows that there are material facts for 
trial resolution. 
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The first element of an act constituting waste is present by the bringing of 
hundreds of truckloads of toxic materials onto the property. This results in a cleanup 
cost of some $1.5 million. This act of waste has attached potential liability exposure 
for cleanup to Plaintiffs. What was brought on the land and by whom is clearly an 
issue of fact. 
Second, there can be no serious issue that the element of the waste being 
done by one legally in possession applies here where the Defendant has had a 
written lease to occupy the property. There has been no issue in the trial court or 
here that Defendant had a right of possession of the gravel pit. The issue has been 
whether that right to use the gravel pit for the extraction of gravel has been abused. 
Finally, the act must prejudice the estate of another is found in the polluting 
activity taking place before the partition of the property while it was owned by the 
Plaintiffs. 
The argument of the Defendant in the trial court that there was no damages, 
adopted by the court, really fails of its own weight. The thrust of the argument is to 
say that if a property which suffered waste is conveyed before the owner has a 
chance to address the waste the obligation to that owner has somehow been 
scrubbed or eliminated. The partition affects not at all the federal environmental 
cleanup exposure of the Plaintiffs for the polluting activity of their land. The damage 
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to the land occurred when the toxic material was placed on the land. The action for 
waste had accrued long before the partition order. 
The district court's ruling confuses the amount of damages with whether 
damages have been incurred at all. Defendant is certainly free to argue at trial that 
the partition may cutoff the damages of these Plaintiffs but there can be no real 
disagreement that the bringing of polluted material onto the land affected the value 
of the interest of the land while Plaintiffs owned it and caused the Plaintiffs to have 
exposure for the cleanup costs that may be ordered by government. 
In summary, there have been facts established which, if accepted at trial, 
would affirm liability in the Defendant for waste conducted on the Plaintiffs' property 
which affect the Plaintiffs long after they leave ownership of the property. 
CONCLUSION 
This court is no doubt well aware that it is not necessary to decide the merits 
of the claims on an appeal from summary judgment. What is at issue here is 
whether there are material facts which are disputed and could be properly resolved 
in a trial. This brief has shown that there are. 
The ruling of the district court was focused solely on damages. The other 
elements of the causes of action are really not disputed. That is, no one disputes 
that a lease was in place, that the defendant had possession of the property for 
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many years, and that there is a huge pile of toxic and solid waste on the property 
that will take at least $1.5 million to cleanup. The only element at issue here is 
whether there are arguable legally recognized damages. 
This brief has shown that both causes of action for breach of contract and 
waste accrued during the ownership of the Plaintiffs/Appellants and that their 
damages are significant. They have become personally liable civilly and, potentially, 
criminally, for these toxic materials being on the property. They have personally 
incurred tens of thousands of dollars in scientific studies so as to establish the 
wrongdoing of the lessee. All of this exposure to liability is consequential damage 
that flows naturally from the nature of the breach and waste which occurred. 
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the district court and reinstate 
the causes of action for breach of contract and waste against the Defendant so that 
they might proceed to trial. 
DATED this l2**> day of August, 2005. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREG^R^^ANDERS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
ADDENDUM "A" 
Minute Entry and Formal Order Granting Motion 
A-1 
ft'A 
M U D DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB - 7 2005 
TOOELE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and 
CATHY ATKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC 
and DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY and 
ORDER M MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case no. 010301120 
Judge RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
This Court, having heard argument Defendant McFarland and Hullinger's (Defendant) 
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 2, 2005, with P. Bruce Badger and Rosemary Beless 
appearing on behalf of Defendant and Gregory T. Sanders appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs 
Thomas Eleopulous and Cathy Atkin (Plaintiffs) and having received and reviewed briefs in the 
matter, finds and orders as follows: 
1) Plaintiffs' claim for trespass is dismissed as Plaintiffs have voluntarily abandoned 
that claim. 
2) Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and waste are likewise dismissed without 
prejudice. The Court bases its dismissal of these claims on the following undisputed facts: 
a) Cathy Atkins and her sister, Patsy Atkins, received an interest in the subject 
property ("Gravel Pit property") as beneficiaries of the Morley T. Atkin 
Trust. The Gravel Pit property was part of a larger parcel of property the 
sisters received from this Trust. 
A-s 00523 
b) The Defendants leased the Gravel Pit property during the sisters joint 
interest in the property. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached the 
lease and committed acts constituting waste on the Gravel Pit property. 
c) Cathy and Patsy Atkin were adverse parties to a partition action filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County entitled Patsy Atkin 
v. Cathy Atkin, civil no. 020300249. On or about Sepetember 23, 2003, 
the larger parcel of property was partitioned pursuant to a trial. 
Thereafter, on March 1, 2004, this Court entered an Order partitioning the 
property, which Order granted Patsy Atkin the Gravel Pit Property free and 
clear of any lien, right or obligation to Cathy Atkin. This ruling was 
consistent with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin as to which parcel of 
the larger parcel she desired. Atkin and co-plaintiff, Eleopulous, have no 
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit property. There was no evidence that 
Patsy Atkin incurred a dimunition in value when the larger parcel was 
partitioned. 
d) No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has been 
instituted for clean-up of the Gravel Pit property and Cathy Atkin has not 
been sued or named as a party responsible for clean-up action as to the 
Gravel Pit property. 
3) A breach of contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which 
is damages. Breach of contract damages seek to place the aggrieved party in the same economic 
position she would have had if the contract was not breached. Mahmoodv. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 2 
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(Utah 1999). Similarly, a waste claim requires three elements of proo£ one of which is prejudice 
to the estate or interest of another. Waste damages may be measured by the either the cost of 
restoration or the difference in market value before and after the injury. Dugan v. Jones, 724 
P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
4) Even assuming for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that the 
Defendant breached the contract and/or committed acts constituting waste, to defeat summary 
judgment, the Plaintiffs must show damage and/or prejudice to their interest in the Gravel Pit 
property. Here, the Plaintiffs fail to show any genuine issue of material fact regarding damages or 
prejudice to their interest. The Plaintiffs have suffered no economic loss from the Defendant's 
breach. While damages may occur in the future if the Plaintiffs are held liable for clean-up costs 
or otherwise, presently no such damages exist, and as such neither their breach of contract nor 
waste claims are ripe for adjudication. Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722 (Utah 2004). While there 
may have been a difference in market value before and after the injury, such dimunition in value of 
the larger parcel was not raised by Plaintiffs as damage. Furthermore, Cathy chose not to keep 
the portion of the larger parcel that included the Gravel Pit property, therefore, she will not bear 
the burden of the dimunition in value of the property, if any. 
ORDER 
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and ORDERS: 
1) the Plaintiffs' trespass claim DISMISSED with prejudice; and 
2) the Plaintiffs' breach of contract and waste claims DISMISSED without prejudice; 
3) the Defendants Counsel to prepare an Order for this Court to sign reflecting this 
Minute Entry and Order. 
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DATED this ^ _ day of February, 2005. 
By, the Court: 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
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Rosemary J. Beless (A0272) 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendant McFarland & Hullinger, LC 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and CATHY 
ATKJN, 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC ) 
and DOES I-X„ ] 
Defendants. 
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 010301120 
1 Judge Randall Skanchy 
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing on February 2, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Gregory J. Sanders. 
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC was represented by its counsel, P. Bruce Badger and 
Rosemary J. Beless. The Court having read and considered the supporting and opposing motion 
papers, and having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fiilly advised, now enters its 
Order consistent with its Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
February 7,2005. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted: 
1. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for breach of contract is dismissed without 
prejudice; 
2. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for waste is dismissed without prejudice; 
3. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for trespass is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ K day of _ f W> T _, 2005 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Randall i . Skanchy 
Third District CourT1-
Approved as to form: 
Gregor^^^J/^feiders 
Kipp and Christian 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Thomas Eleopulous 
and Cathy Atkin 
334179-1 2 GO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the day of February 2005,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Margaret R. Wakeham 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Order re: Partition 
A - II 
A'/? 
•..ri-iu'Jti-E 
JOSEPH F . O R I F I C I (No. 6956) 
4625 Sou th 2300 E a s t , S u i t e 211 
H o l l a d a y , UT 84117 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 272-2373 
F a c s i m i l e : (801) 424-9137 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATSY ATKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CATHY ATKIN, 
Defendant, 
DIANE CASTAGNO, 
Indispensable Party. ) 
AMENDED 
ORDER OF PARTITION 
Civil No. 000300249 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
This matter came before the Court for trial on 
September 26, 2003. The parties and their counsel were present. 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant own approximately 250 acres 
of real estate and 8 mining claims in Tooele County, Utah. The 
land and mining claims were an inheritance from the parties' 
father, Morley T. Atkin. The property is more particularly 
described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2. The Court finds that no formal survey has been 
completed on any of the property. 
3. The Court orders that the property be divided as 
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proposed by Plaintiff in trial exhibit no. 6. 
4. The Court orders the property fronting Highway 36 
to be divided along north-south lines, each parcel to receive 
equal frontage to Highway 36. 
5. The Court orders that Plaintiff receive the south 
end of the highway frontage property which encompasses the gravel 
pit area. The Court orders that the Defendant to receive the 
north side of the highway frontage where she presently resides. 
In addition, Defendant shall receive the 2-1/2 acre parcel at the 
north tip of the property which is zoned for residential 
development. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposal (Exhibit 
6) is equitable with respect to the division of the Foothill 
Property. The Court places weight on the testimony given by Dick 
Wood who actually observed the topography of the Foothill 
Property. The Court reserves the right to revisit the Foothill 
Property partition if necessary. 
7. The Court orders that the Settlement Canyon 
Property (Mountain Property) be divided equally. The Court 
reserves the issue of whether an exchange of mining claims for 
the Mountain Property is equitable. 
8. The Court orders that the parties' mining claims be 
divided equally. The Court reserves the issue of whether the 
mining claims would offset the value of the Settlement Canyon 
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Property (Mountain Property) to determine if there is a more 
equitable way to divide the Settlement Canyon Property. 
9. The Court orders it reserves the issue of access to 
Plaintiff's property through an easement on Defendant's property 
to the existing trail which leads to the mining claims until such 
time as a certified survey is completed. 
10. The Court orders each party to provide the other 
with an accounting of all money paid to improve and/or maintain 
the property being divided so that the Court can determine 
whether a monetary award is appropriate to either party. 
11. The Court orders that it is reasonable and 
necessary for both parties to have equal water. 
12. The Court orders both parties to do anything 
necessary to effectuate the partition of the property and water 
rights ordered by this Court, including executing titles to any 
trailers and/or mobile homes or other documents. The Court 
orders that any removal of the parties' property be accomplished 
in a manner that does not damage existing fixtures. 
13. The Court orders the parties to obtain a formal 
survey of the property with a division as set forth herein. Each 
party is ordered to pay one-half of the expense of obtaining such 
survey. 
14. The Court orders that each party receive a right 
of first refusal on the sale of the property divided by this 
00264 
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Order of Partition. 
15. The Court orders that its Order of Partition 
resolves all issues between the parties and Tom Eleopolus, 
including any contempt proceedings. 
DATED this \ day of jijapr^ raryi 2004 
BY THB^CCOROF 
*.4> 
Rarfflai: _______ 
JOOBS. 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Order of 
Partition, postage prepaid, this %Q day of February, 2004, 
addressed as follows: 
Wesley M. Lang, Esq. 
POWELL & LANG 
50 South Main #850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Defendant 
Cathy Atkin 
22575 South Highway 36 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Diane Castagno 
P.O. Box 39 
Tooele, UT 84074 
LegaJL/Assistant 
-Moris' 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
Gravel Pit Property 
A. Parcel 06-007-A-OOOl containing approx. 2.488 acres. 
B. Parcel 06-008-0-0008 containing approx. 146.50 acr.es. 
The Foothill Property 
A. Parcel 06-009-0-008 containing approximately 51 acres. 
The Mountain Property 
A. Parcel 06-012-0-009 containing approx. 26.67 acres. 
Mining Claims 
A. Two (2) clusters of four (4) mining claims. 
Ml 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
Lease Between the Parties 
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A' 90 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 2nd day 
of January, 1992, by and between the MORLEY T. ATKIN Trust, 
hereinafter referred to as LESSOR, and McFarland and Hullinqer 
whose address is: 915 North Main Street, P.Q. Box 238, Tooele, 
V}tfrh 4ftfrl4 Vtex<iiTk*£t« x^ierred to 9>s LESSEE*. 
WITNESSETH: 
ONE: DEMISE OF PREMISES. The LESSOR, for and in 
consideration of the provisions of this Lease, hereby grants 
and leases unto the LESSEE, AND LESSEE hereby takes from LESSOR, 
the exclusive rights and privileges described in paragraph 
Two hereof, with respect to the land of the LESSOR located 
in Tooele County, State of Utah, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
An area approximately 60 acres in size located 
adjacent to the Southeast side of State Road 36, 
and within the following described parcel: 
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1, 
T4S, R4W# SLB&M, and running thence West 450 
feet; thence 36 45* West 700 feet; thence South 
43 15* East 466.69 feet; thence South 36 45' 
West 466-69 feet; thence North 43 45* West 320 
feet; thence South along the southeast boundary 
of SR 36f 1,470 feet, then East along the quarter 
section line 1,320 feet to the eastern boundary 
of said section; thence North 2,640 feet along 
said boundary line to the point of beginning. 
Said 60 acres presently being developed as a site 
for the removal of aggregates. 
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TWO: USES: Except as set forth in paragraph 2.2, 
LESSEE shall have the exclusive right and privilege with respect 
to all gravel, sand, soil and other aggregates located in, upon 
or under the Leased Premises, (hereinafter referred to as aggregates): 
a. To explore for, remove, take, produce, process, 
extract and sell the leased aggregates. 
b. To construct/ operate and maintain on the 
Leased Premises all trenches, works, buildings, plants, structures, 
appliances, and equipment necessary to the aforesaid uses and 
for the custom processing of materials from other locations. 
c. To use the Leased Premises for any other 
use reasonably incident to the uses described in this paragraph. 
2.2 Lessor's Reserved Rights and Uses. LESSOR reserves 
to himself and his successor's and assigns: 
a. The right to use the Leased Premises for 
all uses not granted to LESSEE hereunder, provided that such 
uses by LESSOR do not interfere with LESSEE'S use or permissible 
intended uses of the Leased Premises; and further provided that 
LESSEE shall not be required to Lake any steps or to spend any 
money to prevent such interferences with Lessee; and 
b. The right to all oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons 
found or present *upon, in or under the Leased Premises, the 
same not being included in the Leased Premises or the leased 
aggregates. 
2.3, Compliance with Laws. LESSEE agrees during 
the terra of this Lease/ at its expense, to obtain and maintain 
in effect all necessary permits and to comply with all applicable, 
valid statutes, regulations and orders of all governmental bodies 
having jurisdiction over LESSEE or the Leased Premises. 
M* 00323 
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THREE: TERM. The term of this Lease shall be for 
nine years and six months commencing on the second day of 
January , 19 92 , and ending on the 30th day of June, 
20 01 , and it is understood, that if during this lease period, 
the trust elects to sell the 60 acres under lease, McFarland and 
Hullinger is granted the right of first refusal to purchase such 
60 acres. 
The Lessee shall pay unto the LESSOR the following rental payments: 
Land rental of $200 per month plus 25C per ton for small amounts 
of aggregates or at a negotiated rate per ton or yard for largo 
projects; such negotiated rate(s) will be made a matter of 
written agreement between the LESSEE AND LESSOR. 
4.2. LESSOR'S right to purchase aggregates. During 
the term of this Lease, LESSOR may at any time purchase from LESSEE 
any aggregates produced, extracted, processed or stored upon the 
Leased Premises, at the then current fair market price of said 
aggregates. 
FIVE: DETERMINING PRODUCTION. LESSEE shall furnish 
to the LESSOR on or before the fifth day of the month of each 
month after the first month of this Lease, copies of all weight 
slips or weight lists for aggregates removed from the Leased Premises. 
LESSOR shall also have the right to inspect the books of LESSEE 
l 
either personally or by designated representatives, the same to 
be open and available to said persons during normal working hours 
and days at LESSEE'S regular place of business, and LESSEE shall 
provide copies of said records upon request of LESSOR, the cost 
of making said copies to be paid by LESSOR at the rate of ten 
cents per page. To the extent possible, LESSEE'S records shall 
be in a form which provides information with respect to the Leased 
Premises separately from other property operated by LESSEE. They 
will include the location and results of exploration openings, 
the character of formations and the analysis of minerals encountered 
on the Leased Premises. LESSEE will furnish LESSOR with a copy 
of such information upon completion of or the abandonment of any 
exploration, together with a true copy of all surface and subsurface 
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surveys made of the Leased premises. LESSEE shall give LESSOR 
access to all facilities owned or used by it for making such observation 
measurements and records as LESSOR may desire. 
SIX: OPERATION OF THE LEASED PREMISES. LESSEE shall work the 
Leased Premises diligently and efficiently, in accordance with good 
engineering practices, and in a workmanlike manner. Overburden will 
be removed at least twenty feet in advance of aggregate removal. 
All worked areas will be contoured so as to blend in a sightly and 
safe manner with adjoining worked areas and adjoining property. Stock 
piles will be kept clean of debris, and shall be kept level. LESSEE 
shall be responsible to survey and stake the boundaries of the Leased 
Premises and to so work the area adjacent to adjoinging premises so as 
to prevent the sloughing of soil or the undermining of the adjoining 
premises. All fences, utility appurtenances and other surface or 
subsurface objects upon the leased premises shall be protected by 
adequate and proper supports and the soil shall not be removed for 
at least five feet on any side of any utility appurtenance. All damage 
to fences, gates, utility appurtenances, and other objects upon the 
leased premises shall be repaired or replaced to their original condition 
at the cost and expense of LESSEE. 
6.2. LESSOR shall have no obligations to make any repairs or to 
incur any expense whatsoever in connection with the Leased Premises. 
SEVEN: IMJEJSL- LESSOR shall be responsible for the payment of 
all real property taxes assessed for the premises by the Tooele County 
Assessor. 
7.2. PERSONAL PROPERTY and MINING PROPERTY TAXES. SALES TAXES. 
The LESSEE shall be responsible for all taxes upon personal property 
owned, used or leased by it upon the Leased Premises. It shall also 
be responsible for all Mining taxes assessed by the State of Utah, and 
all sales taxes for the sales of aggregates removed from the premises. 
LESSOR shall be entitled to receive copies of all returns prepared by 
LESSEE in reporting taxes for which it is responsible as provide by 
this paragraph. 
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7.3. LESSEE shall not permit any part of the Leased Premises 
to be sold for delinquent tax assessments against its property or 
for which it is responsible. 
7.4. LESSEE shall not be liable for taxes and assessments which 
are assessed and levied on the interests and rights reserved to LESSOR 
under this Lease. LESSEE shall not be obligated to pay any franchise, 
corporate, estate or transfer tax of the LESSOR or any income tax upon 
the LESSOR'S income, or any other tax upon the rent payable under this 
Lease. 
EIGHT: INSURANCE COVERAGE. Throughout the term of this Lease, 
LESSEE shall, at its cost and expense, maintain and keep in force 
with respect to the Leased Premises, comrehensive general public, 
liability insurance, naming LESSOR as an additional insured, in amounts 
not less than the combined single limit of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars 
for personal injury or death to all persons in any one occurrence and 
Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars for damage to property. Such 
insurance shall be written by companies of recognized financial standing 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah. The policies shall 
contain a provision that they cannot be cancelled except upon fifteen 
days' prior notice to the LESSOR. 
8.2. Evidence of Coverage. LESSEE shall deliver to LESSOR 
certificates or duplicate originals of such policies, together with 
evidence of payments of the premiums thereon, and shall deliver renewal 
policies or binders prior to the expiration of any existing policy. 
8.3. Workman's Compensation, other insurance. LESSEE shall 
maintain workman's compensation and such other insurance as may be 
required by law or agreement for all persons working for or under 
LESSEE upon the Leased Premises. LESSOR shall not be responsible for 
any expense Incurred by any person upon the Leased Premises during the 
term of this agreement. 
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NINE: MECHANIC'S LIENS. LESSOR shall not be liable for any labor 
or materials furnished to LESSEE on credit and no mechanic's or other 
lien for any such labor or mateirals shall attach to or affect the 
interest of LESSOR in and to the Leased Premises. If a mechanic's 
lien is filed against the Leased Premises, LESSEE shall, within 30 days 
after notice to the LESSEE, take such action by bonding, deposit or 
payment, as will remove or satisfy the lien. If LESSEE shall fail 
to remove the same within said period, LESSOR may pay such amounts and 
take such actions as may be necessary to remove or satisfy the lien 
and LESSEE shall reimburse LESSOR for all reasonable costs and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by LESSOR in connection 
therewith. 
TEN: EMINENT DOMAIN. If a substantial portion of the Leased 
Premises shall be taken by virture of eminent domain or for any public 
or quasi-public use which renders the use of the remainder of the 
Leased Premises by Lessee uneconomical, then Lessee may, by notice 
to Lessor, terminate this Lease effective upon the taking of actual 
possession by the condemning authority. Within 30 days after such 
termination, LESSOR shall refund to LESSEE any rental payments covering 
land so taken prepaid by LESSEE for a period after the date of terminatio 
10.2. Condemnation Award. LESSEE shall be entitled to prosecute 
or defend against a claim for and to receive from a condemnation award 
a sum equal to the fair market value of LESSEE'S improvements on the 
Leased Premises and of LESSEE'S leasehold estate in the Leased Premises. 
LESSOR shall be entitled to claim and to receiv the balance of 
the award. LESSOR may also prosecute or defend an action for condemnatioi 
for his own rights in the leased premises, and shall be entitled to 
the award for said rights. 
ELEVEN: DEFAULT. In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof by the LESSEE, or upon failure of the LESSEE to make any 
payment or payments of rent when the same shall become due, or within 
five days thereafter, the LESSOR shall at his option have the following 
remedies: 
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(a) LESSOR shall have the right, upon failure of the LESSEE 
to remedy the default within five days after written notice, or if the 
breach is such that it cannot be fully rectified within said five day 
period, should the LESSEE fail to take substantial steps to the accomplls 
ment of the correction of the breach, the LESSOR may serve upon the 
LESSEE by Certified Mail at its address given above, a notice of terminat 
of this Lease, and all rental payments made in advance for the term 
hereof, shall be forfeited as liquidated damages for said breach. 
LESSEE agrees that LESSOR may re-enter the premises and take possession 
of the same and all property of the LESSEE thereon, without legal 
process or further notice, and LESSEE shall immediately become a 
tenant at will of the LESSOR. 
(b) LESSOR may bring suit to collect all damages, delinquent 
rent, and other costs, including attorney's fees incurred by the 
LESSOR'S breach or delinquency. 
(c) The use of one or the other of said remedies on one or 
more occassions, does not prevent the use of the other remedy on 
subsequent occassions. 
11.2. Interest on Lale Payments. LESSEE shall pay LESSOR 
interest at the rate of 18* per annmn upon all amounts due to LESSOR 
which are unpaid for more than fifteen days after their due date, 
computed from the due date until the date of payment, both before and 
after judgment. 
11.3. Lessee's Bankruptcy. If LESSEE is adjudicated a 
bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or 
file a voluntary petition under any law having for its purpose the 
adjudication of Lessee as a bankrupt, or the extension of time of 
payment, composition, adjustment, modification, settlement or 
satisfaction of the liabilities of LESSEE, or if a receiver is appointed 
for the property of LESSEE by reason of the insolvency of LESSEE, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary elsewhere in this Lease, this 
Lease shall immediately terminate and be of no further force or effect, 
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and LESSEE shall be immediately have the right of re-entry and possessic 
of the premises, without notice to LESSEE, and LESSEE shall for all 
purposes be considered a tenant at will. 
TWELVE: FORCE MAJEURE, LESSEE and LESSOR shall not be liable 
for any failure or delay in performing any obligation hereunder, other 
than the payment of money, caused by or resulting from strike, lockout 
or other industrial disturbance, war, fire, earthquake, explosion, 
flood, storm, act of God, accident, mandatory or voluntary regulations, 
rules or orders Issued or requested by any governmental agency; inabilit; 
to operate except at a loss due to prevailing market conditions; 
curtailment or inability to obtain sufficient labor or utilities; 
breakdown of machinery or equipment; interruption of transportation 
facilities or any other cause whatsoever (whether or not of the same 
class or kind as those set forth above) beyond their reasonable control 
affecting them or any of their suppliers (herein called "force majeure")• 
No party shall have any obligation to contest any governmental action, 
regulation, rule or order or to make any concession or grant any demand 
or request in order to bring to an end any strikes or other concerted 
act of workmen, or to expend any sums to avoid the effect of force 
majeure. 
THIRTEEN: SURRENDER OF POSSESSION, At the expiration or 
prior to termination of this Lease, LESSEE shall surrender to LESSOR 
peaceable possession of the Leased Premises in such condition as may 
be required by good mining and engineering practies and by applicable 
laws, regulations and orders of all governmental agencies having 
Jurisdiction over the Leased Premises. If LESSEE fails to leave 
the Leased Premises in such condition, after 30 days1 notice to LESSEE 
specifying the condition objected to by LESSOR, and giving LESSEE an 
opportunity to remedy such condition, LESSOR may take such action as may 
be reasonably necessary to put the Leased Premises into the condition 
required by this paragraph, and LESSEE shall be liable to LESSOR for the 
reasonable expense thereof. This provision shall survive the expiration 
or termination of this Lease, notwithstanding any other provision to 
the contrary. 
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^3.2. Lessee's Property. Within 90 days after the expiration 
or prior termination of this Lease, LESSEE shall remove from the 
Leased Premises all its equipment and property located thereon. 
If LESSEE fails to remove the same, unless the same has been attached 
by legal process of LESSOR, within the time provided, it shall become the 
property of the LESSOR. LESSOR may thereafter remove the same and LESSEE 
shall be liable to LESSOR for the reasonable expenses incurred by 
LESSOR in connection therewith. 
FOURTEEN: QUIET ENJOYMENT. LESSOR warrants that he has the 
right to lease to LESSEE the rights and privilges set forth herein 
and LESSOR covenants and agrees that if and so long as LESSEE shall 
perform and observe all of the terms, conditions, covenants, and 
provisions of this Lease, which LESSEE is to perform and observe, 
LESSEE shall lawfully and quietly have, hold and enjoy the exclusive 
rights and privileges. 
FIFTEEN: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 
15.1. Prohibition of Assignment and Subletting. LESSEE may 
not assign or sublet this Lease or any part of the Leased Premises 
without the written consent of the LESSOR first had and obtained, 
which consent LESSON, agrees not to unreasonably withhold. 
15.2. Notice. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall 
be in writing and delivered by certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to the parties at their address set forth above for LESSEE, and to 
LESSOR at 623 East Crestview Drive, Tooele, Utah 84074, or to such other 
addresses as either party shall have designated to the other by notice. 
The date of giving notice by mail shall be the date of mailing shown on 
the envelope. 
15.3. Waiver,* No delay or failure on either party's part to 
enforce any right or claim which it may have hereunder shall constitute 
a waiver on such party's part of such right or claim. Any waiver by 
either party of any term, provisions or condition hereof or of any 
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or of any default hereunder in any one or more instances shall not 
be deemed to be a further or continuing waiver of such term, provision, 
or condition or of any subsequent default hereunder. 
15.4. Paragraph Headings. Paragraph headings are for reference 
only, and do not affect the meaning of any paragraph. 
15.5. No Modification* This Lease represents the entire under-
standing of the parties with reBpect to its subject matter, and no 
term, condition, negotiation or provision not contained herein is of 
any force or effect whatsoever. This Lease may not be changed orally, 
but only by an agreement in writing signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought. 
15.6. Successors and lyssigns. The covenants and agreements 
contained in this Lease sliall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be 
binding upon the parties hereto, and upon their respective successors, 
permitted assigns, heirs, executors and administrators or personal 
representatives, except as otherwise hereinbefore provided. 
15.7. Attorney's fees. Any party breaching this Lease shall 
pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the aggrieved party, and all 
court costs or other reasonable charges incurred in obtaining a 
remedy and satisfaction. 
15.8. Severance. If any provision of this Lease is held 
Invalid, the remaining terms, paragraphs and provisions shall remain 
in full force and effect. 
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto the date first above 
written. 
LESSOR: 
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Mocley T. Atkin Trust 
Lois Atkin, Trustee 
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(a) Authority of Administrator 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the 
appropriate district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past 
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to 
such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. A 
transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, or disposal 
taking place after such solid waste or hazardous waste has left the possession or control of such transporter if the 
transportation of such waste was under a sole contractural fFNH arrangement arising from a published tariff and 
acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail and such transporter has exercised due care in the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such waste. The Administrator shall provide notice to the 
affected State of any such suit. The Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under 
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and the 
environment. 
(b) Violations 
Any person who willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, any order of the Administrator under subsection 
(a) of this section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States district court to enforce such order, be fined 
not more than $5,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply continues. 
(c) Immediate notice 
Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at any site which has presented an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to human health or the environment, the Administrator shall provide immediate notice to the appropriate 
local government agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall require notice of such endangerment to be promptly 
posted at the site where the waste is located. 
(d) Public participation in settlements 
Whenever the United States or the Administrator proposes to covenant not to sue or to forbear from suit or to settle any 
claim arising under this section, notice, and opportunity for a public meeting in the affected area, and a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on the proposed settlement prior to its final entry shall be afforded to the public. The decision 
of the United States or the Administrator to enter into or not to enter into such Consent Decree, covenant or agreement 
shall not constitute a final agency action subject to judicial review under this chapter or chapter 7 of Title 5. 
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(a) In general 
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf— 
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, 
to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter; 
or 
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present 
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or 
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this 
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator. 
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the 
alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this 
subsection may be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or in the District 
Court of the District of Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy 
or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, 
referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), 
to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the 
act or duty referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 
6928(a) and £g] of this title. 
(b) Actions prohibited 
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation to~ 
(i) the Administrator; 
(ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and 
(iii) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, 
except that such action maybe brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section 
respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter; or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of 
the United States or a State to require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, 
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prohibition, or order. 
In any action under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a 
matter of right. 
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section prior to ninety days after the plaintiff 
has given notice of the endangerment to~ 
(i) the Administrator; 
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur; 
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, 
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section 
respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter. 
(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section if the Administrator, in order to restrain or 
abate acts or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the activities which may present the alleged 
endangerment— 
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under section 6973 of this title or under section 106 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 9606L rFNll 
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C.A. § 96041; 
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041 and is 
diligently proceeding with a remedial action under that Act f42 U.S.C.A. $ 9601 et seq.]; or 
(iv) has obtained a court order (including a consent decree) or issued an administrative order under section 106 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 980 rFN21 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96061 or 
section 6973 of this title pursuant to which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal action, Remedial 
Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or proceeding with a remedial action. 
In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause (iv), actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section are 
prohibited only as to the scope and duration of the administrative order referred to in clause (iv). 
(C) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)( 1 )(B) of this section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts 
or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the activities which may present the alleged 
endangerment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section; 
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
f\'3(t 
Page 3 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041; or 
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041 and is 
diligently proceeding with a remedial action under that Act f42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.]. 
(D) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section by any person (other than a State or local 
government) with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a disposal facility, nor to restrain or 
enjoin the issuance of a permit for such facility. 
(E) In any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as 
a matter of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the 
Administrator or the State shows that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
(F) Whenever any action is brought under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the United States, the plaintiff 
shall serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the United States and with the Administrator. 
(c) Notice 
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice 
to the Administrator that he will commence such action, except that such action may be brought immediately after such 
notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter. Notice 
under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation. Any action 
respecting a violation under this chapter may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in which such 
alleged violation occurs. 
(d) Intervention 
In any action under this section the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right. 
(e) Costs 
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section or section 6976 of this title, may award 
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing 
party, whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(f) Other rights preserved 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous 
waste, or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency). 
(g) Transporters 
A transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, or 
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disposal, referred to in subsection (a)( 1 )(B) of this section taking place after such solid waste or hazardous waste has left 
the possession or control of such transporter, if the transportation of such waste was under a sole contractual arrangement 
arising from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail and such transporter has exercised 
due care in the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such waste. 
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(1) Whenever the board determines that any person is in violation of any applicable 
approved hazardous wastes operation plan or solid waste plan, the requirements of this 
part, or any of the board's rules, it may cause written notice of that violation to be 
served upon the alleged violator. The notice shall specify the provisions of the plan, 
this part or rule alleged to have been violated, and the facts alleged to constitute 
the violation. 
(2) The board may: 
(a) issue an order requiring that necessary corrective action be taken within a 
reasonable time; or 
(b) request the attorney general or the county attorney in the county in which the 
violation is taking place to bring a civil action for injunctive relief and 
enforcement of this part. 
(3) Pending promulgation of rules for corrective action under Section 19-6- 105, the 
board may issue corrective action orders on a case-by-case basis, as necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this part. 
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(1) As used in this section, "RCRA" means the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq. 
(2) Any person who violates any order, plan, rule, or other requirement issued or 
adopted under this part is subject in a civil proceeding to a penalty of not more than 
$13,000 per day for each day of violation. 
(3) On or after July 1, 1990, no person shall knowingly: 
(a) transport or cause to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this part to a facility that does not have a hazardous waste operation plan or 
permit under this part or RCRA; 
(b) treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this 
part: 
(i) without having obtained a hazardous waste operation plan or permit as required 
by this part or RCRA; 
(ii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a hazardous 
waste operation plan or permit; or 
(iii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any rules or 
regulations under this part or RCRA; 
(c) omit material information or make any false material statement or representation 
in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, operation plan, or other 
document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with this part or RCRA 
or any rules or regulations made under this part or RCRA; and 
(d) transport or cause to be transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste 
identified or listed under this part and required by rules or regulations made under 
this part or RCRA to be accompanied by a manifest. 
(4)(a)(i) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of Subsection (3)(a) or (b) 
is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
of a felony under Subsection (3) (a) or (b) is subject to a fine of not more than 
$50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed five 
years, or both. 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection 
(3) (a) or (b) , the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the term of 
imprisonment authorized in Subsection (4)(a)(ii). 
(b) (i) Any person who knowingly violates any of the provisions of Subsection (3) (c) 
or (d) is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
A-M3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 19-6-113 
Page 2 
of a felony for a violation of Subsection (3) (c) or (d) is subject to a fine of not 
more than $50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to 
exceed two years, or both. 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection 
(3)(c) or (d), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the imprisonment 
authorized in Subsection (4)(b)(ii). 
(c)(i) Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, or disposes of any 
hazardous waste identified or listed under this part in violation of Subsection 
(3) (a), (b) , (c) , or (d) , who knows at that time that he thereby places another 
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted 
of a felony described in Subsection (4) (c) (i) is subject to a fine of not more than 
$250,000 or imprisonment for a term not to exceed 15 years, or both. 
(iii) A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental instrumentality, upon 
conviction of violating Subsection (4) (c) (i) , is subject to a fine of not more than 
$1,000,000. 
(5) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (5) (b) and (c) and Section 19-6- 722, all 
penalties assessed and collected under authority of this section shall be deposited in 
the General Fund. 
(b) The department may reimburse itself and local governments from monies collected 
from civil penalties for qualifying extraordinary expenses incurred in qualifying 
environmental enforcement activities. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 78-3-14.5, the department may reimburse 
itself and local governments from monies collected from criminal fines for qualifying 
extraordinary expenses incurred in prosecutions for violations of this part. 
(d) The department shall regulate reimbursements by making rules that define: 
(i) qualifying environmental enforcement activities; and 
(ii) qualifying extraordinary expenses. 
(6) Prosecution for criminal violations of this part may be commenced by the attorney 
general, the county attorney, or the district attorney as appropriate under Section 
17-18-1 or 17-18-1.7 in any county where venue is proper. 
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(1) A person who violates any provision of this part or any order, permit, plan 
approval, or rule issued or adopted under this part is subject to a civil penalty of 
not more than $10,000 per day for each day of violation as determined in a civil 
hearing under Title 63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, except: 
(a) any violation of Subsection 19-6-804(1) or (3), regarding landfills, is subject 
to the penalty under Subsection 19-6-804(4) rather than the penalties under this 
section; and 
(b) any violation of Subsection 19-6-808(1), (2), or (3) regarding payment of the 
recycling fee by the tire retailer is subject to penalties as provided in Subsection 
19-6-808(4) rather than the penalties under this section. 
(2) The board may bring an action in the name of the state to restrain a person from 
continuing a violation of this part and to require the person to perform necessary 
remediation regarding a violation of this part. 
(3) When the executive secretary finds a situation exists in violation of this part 
that presents an immediate threat to the public health or welfare, the executive 
secretary may issue an emergency order under Title 63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
(4) The executive secretary may revoke the registration of a waste tire recycler or 
transporter who violates any provision of this part or any order, plan approval, 
permit, or rule issued or adopted under this part. 
(5) The executive secretary may revoke the tire storage permit for a storage facility 
that is in violation of any provision of this part or any order, plan approval, permit, 
or rule issued or adopted under this part. 
(6) If a person has been convicted of violating a provision of this part prior to a 
finding by the executive secretary of a violation of the same provision in an 
administrative hearing, the executive secretary may not assess a civil monetary penalty 
under this section for the same offense for which the conviction was obtained. 
(7) All penalties collected under this section shall be deposited in the fund. 
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